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A.   The Context 
Reaching the poorest and hungry groups of the population, including those who might be left 
out of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) involves policy makers at the central and 
local levels of government. While there has been considerable focus on appropriate targeting 
mechanisms to reach the poor (see e.g., World Bank 1990, Besley and Kanbur, 1993), 
attention as to which level of government should be involved, as well as the interactions 
between levels of government in reaching the poor, is more recent (see von Braun and Grote, 
2002, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000 and a survey by Birner, 2007).   
From the policy perspective, it is important to examine the instruments available at each level 
of government in order to meet the needs of the poorest. If the responsibility for these groups 
is seen primarily as that of the central government, then direct federal/central government 
programs, effectively targeted but building on local information come into focus. If the 
primary responsibility is local, the policy focus shifts to own-source revenues for financing 
the expenditures and for greater local accountability, together with a modicum of 
equalization transfers so that all local governments have similar capacities to provide for the 
poorest.  
Designing central programs to reach the poorest may be difficult without local information. 
This is because the central government, particularly in large countries such as Mexico and 
China, lacks the ability to precisely define marginal groups or households that may not 
benefit from more general growth and prosperity. Yet local officials may not share the 
objectives of the center—and may prefer to divert central funds to meet objectives that are of 
higher value to them. This policy dilemma illustrates difficulties with “overlapping” 
responsibilities between different levels of government and in designing effective special 
purpose programs, financed by the center and implemented by local governments. 
The constraints in designing effective centrally determined special purpose programs in 
developing countries are legendary. To some extent these are similar to the problems in 
designing foreign assistance strategies that effectively reach the poorest target groups in the 
recipient countries—country elites may not share the altruistic objectives of donors. The 
issue is to design policies that build on local information, yet minimize the incentives at the 
local level to divert resources from the target groups. Similar issues arise in the context of 
foreign assistance designed to reach the poorest groups of the population, such as under the 
program of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) program. 
Local governments with the most limited resources and tax bases may also have the greatest 
requirements for supporting the poorest groups and individuals. Thus, providing for these 
groups in the poorer localities may require assistance from the center. However, the center 
may also have concerns for the poorer groups living in the relatively well-to-do localities.  
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Urban poverty, including in the richer areas, is becoming an increasing problem—in addition 
to the typical rural poor. Reaching these groups may not be easy, and could generate moral 
hazard difficulties as local officials may wish to minimize their financing of such activities 
and shift the burden to the center. A continuation of pockets of extreme poverty in the richer 
localities tends to reflect divergences of preferences between the center and local officials—
local politicians and officials may not be particularly interested in such groups—often the 
indigent without family support mechanisms that may not have a significant political voice.  
Relatively incomplete information is available to the center on the poor and hungry without 
family support, as well as the budgetary operations at the subnational levels. This generates 
incentives for sub-national governments to divert central funds allocated for the poorest. 
This paper examines the fiscal instruments available to different levels of government and 
their interactions to enhance the effectiveness of public policies for the poorest and hungry 
groups. Addressing the leakages associated with central funding and local implementation is 
based on the design of the programs incorporating competition for resources—both across 
jurisdictions and over time. This also involves moving budget processes towards greater 
orientation to results—together with mechanisms for intertemporal feedback in the allocation 
of resources in the future. 
B.   Insights from successful programs to reach the poorest: Some examples from China 
and Mexico 
Depending on the circumstances, either centralized or decentralized approaches may be 
adopted to address the needs of the poorest.2 The options are highlighted by the experiences 
of two large countries—Mexico and China. Mexico has a successful central program to reach 
the poorest, whereas China has relied on an effective local program. Despite the successes of 
both programs, there are continuing challenges and difficulties in both cases. There may well 
be a convergence of solutions in the future—with a more significant role for the center in 
China, and for state and local governments in Mexico. 
 
Mexico, which is a federal state, has effectively built a safety net on the basis of a central 
program—the Progresa/Opportunidades, a conditional cash transfer program that was 
created in 1997. The targeting has worked effectively (see Levy and Rodriguez 2004, Coady 
and Parker, 2002). However, the Progresa/Opportunidades model has been difficult to 
replicate, even in smaller countries, as administrative overheads are substantive. Also in 
                                                 
2
 Note that this paper does not provide a treatise on decentralization per se. Readers may consult Ahmad and 
Brosio (2006) for a review of the more recent literature in this area. The paper does not attempt a survey of 
targeted programs either, but uses selective illustrations to examine differing approaches to meeting the needs of 
the poorest groups in society. 
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Mexico, success has been somewhat of a handicap and successive governments have added 
new objectives and responsibilities that make the program unwieldy and distortive. The 
question is whether the program with its increased remit can continue to target effectively in 
Mexico, and replicated elsewhere in Latin America.  
 
In China, a unitary state, programs such as wu bao (see below) were used in the past to 
provide support for the poorest groups in rural areas. Such programs were predicated on 
locally generated information and management. With increasing inequality in China since the 
economic reforms of the 1990s, and dispersion in local government revenues, the issue now 
is whether local governments have the incentives and resources to continue to effectively 
provide support to the poorest groups.  
 
Each type of program faces challenges and difficulties as described below. 
  
Centralized provision 
As mentioned, a central government might wish to carry out the social assistance program 
itself, with or without local identification of recipients. Given the success of Opportunidades/ 
Progressa, Mexican administrations have tried to use it as a compensation mechanism for 
different adjustment policies over time, and the remit and coverage of the program has 
increased significantly. At end-2005, Opportunidades covered 24 million individuals (5 
million households)—roughly a quarter of the total population or 70 percent of the rural 
population (Levy 2006). In contrast, the Chinese programs were more tightly targeted, with 
the numbers of people receiving social relief in the early 1990s (including both the wu bao 
and the more extensive poor households support, pinkun hu) were around 6 percent of the 
rural population. 
 
Another federal program in Mexico, the Seguro Popular, has also been designed to provide 
direct support for health care for the uninsured population. It has been criticized on the 
grounds that it, together with an expanding Opportunidades program, encourages an 
expansion of the informal sector (Levy, 2006) and poses a constraint to the orderly 
development of formal sector activity. This has a disincentive effect on labor markets and 
also limits the growth of tax revenues.  Thus, these programs may perversely perpetuate the 
problems that a safety net should solve. 
 
The issue of overlapping responsibilities also creates difficulties in Mexican 
intergovernmental finances. Whereas the Opportunidades program has been effective in 
meeting its initial objectives, it is seen as encroaching on a typical area of local 
responsibility. Indeed, given the presence of significant federal earmarked transfers for basic 
education and health care, states and local governments have begun to treat these areas as 
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effectively the responsibility of the federal government—despite a decade long effort at 
decentralization. 
 
It has proved difficult to replicate Opportunidades elsewhere in Latin America. Attempts 
were made, for instance, in the Red Solidaridad in El Salvador, and Tekoporã in Paraguay—
these are small and homogeneous countries relative to Mexico (see Veras Soares and Britto, 
2007). The centrally designed programs in these countries have involved significant 
administrative costs in establishing eligibility of beneficiaries and effective management. 
Attempts to involve local governments in the programs have not been particularly successful, 
as the political benefits are thought to accrue to the “central governments”, whereas the 
political costs are expected to be borne by the localities. 
 
In general, direct provision by the center could be achieved with relatively broad targeting—
albeit at a fiscal cost, leakages to the less poor. It may be more efficient to design 
mechanisms that better utilize the information available to local governments (including at 
the community level), but with the center equalizing the capacity of the relevant level of 
governments to undertake the projects. But would the local governments have the appropriate 
incentives to do so?   
 
Local provision 
A good example of local identification and provision for the poorest is from rural China. 
Since the establishment of the Peoples Republic, a key element in reaching the poorest was 
the mechanism known as wu bao, or five guarantees. It related to a minimum provision of 
food, health care, shelter and clothing and funeral costs for all citizens—hence the term 5 
guarantees. Its operation is based on local (often village or community-based) information to 
identify the poorest groups in society without extended household support, particularly in 
rural areas where the reach of formal social security instruments is at best limited. As is 
evident, the wu bao families and individuals are often among the poorest (Ahmad and 
Hussain, 1991). Over time, the term came to denote a special category of persons—those 
unable to earn a living and lacking relatives for support. These are predominantly the orphans 
and elderly or disabled, without family support. As is clear, the identification of the 
vulnerable without family support has to be based on local knowledge. Such individuals tend 
also not to be associated with elites or interest groups that often have an interest in 
“capturing” resources accruing to the localities.  
 
The social protection mechanisms in China are undergoing significant change. While the 
market-orientation of the past decade has brought about rapidly rising real incomes, 
particularly for families able to participate in the labor market, it has generated greater 
vulnerability for some of the poorest. The social protection system has come under strain as 
the resources available to lower level local governments, particularly in the poorer regions, 
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have been subject to greater constraints. On the one hand, there has been a recentralization of 
the main sources of revenue, and on the other, additional spending responsibilities have 
accrued to lower levels. Thus, the resources available to provide support or social assistance 
to the poorest, including the wu bao, tend to vary by localities. Moreover, with growing 
inequalities, “local capture” may begin to be a problem in China, as it is in other parts of the 
world (see Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, 2006). 
 
A more recent intervention, the Di Bao, is a largely urban program providing conditional 
cash transfers to individuals below the poverty line. It started in 1999 and now provides 
support to around 22 million people, or 6 percent of the urban population (Ravallion 2007)—
or roughly the same magnitude as the rural anti-poverty programs (wu bao and pinkun hu).  
Local governments select recipients, and co-financing is available from the center. Central 
financing varies by province—from zero in the rich coastal regions to 100 percent in Tibet. 
In principle, the program encompasses two key characteristics: (1) local identification of 
need, with (2) a degree of equalization in the financing arrangements. Ravallion (2007) 
however finds that, despite the central “equalization”, the richer localities are able to support 
higher income levels for program eligibility than poorer ones. 
 
The policy design issues in China are complicated by its multi-tiered administration, in which 
nested budgeting decisions are made—the center decides how much to allocate to a given 
province, which then decides on allocations to prefectures, which make transfers to counties 
and then sequentially down to townships. Allowing the localities to determine eligibility 
criteria puts the onus on the localities, but at the possible cost of excluding some of the 
deserving poorest. Tighter central determination of eligibility would move the di bao closer 
to the opportunidades model, although still relying on local identification and administration. 
This could also make the costs to the center open-ended and does not preclude diversion of 
centrally provided funds. 
 
In the policy options that follow—we examine decision making in large multi-level countries 
(reflecting both Mexico and China) based on work by Ahmad, Tandberg and Zhang (2002), 
and also look at the budgeting model that might be relevant in minimizing leakages (Ahmad 
and Martinez, 2004). 
 
The policy options 
An ideal system of transfers would involve clearly identified criteria provided by the center 
to local governments to assist them in looking after the poorest (Ravallion 2007). But, for 
overall budgetary constraints and efficiency of spending, this requires that local governments 
disclose information accurately on the extent of need, and also not divert central funds to 
other uses. It is not clear that they face the incentives to disclose this information—on the 
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contrary the localities may distort the information in order to maximize transfers from higher 
levels. 
 
Thus, central governments face a dilemma. Reaching some of the poorest requires local 
information for effective identification and targeting. This cannot be obtained without the 
cooperation of local governments. Direct central provision is possible but requires 
administrative capabilities and resources, and may generate negative effects, such as 
incentives to remain in the informal sector. Local governments may have the information, but 
the poorer ones lack the financing to carry out the functions, and in the “game” with the 
center, may lack incentives to effectively use central transfers.  
 
C.   Financing instruments for social programs 
In this section, we use insights of the new political economy literature on intergovernmental 
finances (see Lockwood, 2006 for a survey) to examine options for improved provision of 
public services for the poor. This involves the design of taxes at the sub-national level, and 
equally important appropriate transfers. The interaction of instruments matters, as does the 
budgeting framework, especially  the use of contracts together with new multi-year 
budgeting techniques that focus on the “results or outcomes” of specific programs. These 
mechanisms build on regional and intertemporal competition, even if there are overlapping 
responsibilities. 
 
Each issue is discussed sequentially below.  
 
Tax instruments 
A key element in accountable self-governance at the sub-national level is access to own-
source revenues at the margin, so that a jurisdiction is able to raise additional funds needed 
for its key local spending. This is also a fundamental precondition for the establishment of 
hard-budget constraints at the sub-national level, without which no-bailout conditions are 
barely credible (Ambrosiano and Bordignon, 2006). However, whether or not a local 
jurisdiction has incentives to use its own-tax handles is heavily influenced by transfer 
design—if a local government could rely on transfers rather than own-source revenues, it 
probably will, with resulting erosion in accountability. This has been the recent experience in 
Mexico.  
 
Another drawback with primary reliance on local tax bases is that these tend to vary 
considerably, especially in large countries. For instance, in Mexico, the Federal District 
accounts for roughly half of all property tax collections—which are in any case low even by 
Latin American standards. Thus, with considerable local variation in revenue bases, and 
limited or no control over rate structures, the responsibility for providing a modicum of 
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social services, especially in the poorer regions, generally passes to the higher levels of 
government. 
 
Table 1 Sources of Tax Revenues of Local Governments in Selected Federal Countries, 
2001 (percent of total revenue) 
Country Income 
tax and 
tax on 
profits 
Payroll 
tax  
Property 
tax 
General 
consumption 
tax  
Taxes 
on 
specific 
goods 
and 
services 
User 
Charges 
Other 
taxes 
Australia 0 0 100.0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 37.7 19.1 10.0 22.7 3.8 1.7 5.0 
Belgium 85.8 0 0 1.4 7.9 4.6 0.3 
Canada 0 0 91.6 0.2 0 1.6 6.5 
Germany 77.1 0 16.6 5.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 
Mexico 0 0.1 88.5 0 1.9 0.9 8.6 
Switzerland 83.1 0 16.6 0 0.2 0.1 0 
United States 6.2 0 71.5 12.4 5.1 4.8 0 
Source: Ambrosanio and Bordignon 2006. 
 
There is a tendency to administer centrally the broadly based taxes, such as the VAT and the 
corporate income tax, as in Mexico in the late 1980s, where a number of state level taxes 
were abolished on efficiency grounds to make “fiscal space for a centrally administered 
VAT.” The states effectively ceded their tax bases to the center for guaranteed transfers. Also 
in China in 1994 the establishment of a VAT to be administered by a central State 
Administration of Taxation was a critical element of the fiscal reforms. More recently, in 
Australia a range of state taxes were replaced by a VAT, which is administered centrally 
although all revenues collected are redistributed to the states through the Commonwealth 
Grants Commission. 
 
In all cases, transfers have been established to compensate for the loss of sub-national 
revenues (particularly state or provincial sales taxes among others) eliminated as a result of 
the establishment of the VAT. In China, the equalization transfer introduced in 1994 has 
gradually increased in importance as additional funds have been made available. Mexico had 
a complex system of untied and earmarked transfers, but did not have an equalization 
framework. The weak own-source revenues of the lower tiers of government, and limited 
accountability, together with an opaque and complex transfer design probably explains why a 
central program in Mexico has been its most successful poverty reduction instrument. Lower 
level of government lack the incentives or financing to effectively replicate Opportunidades 
at the sub-national level. 
 
 
Figure 1 Property tax collections in Mexican States (Pesos) 
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Mexico: Property Tax Collections, 2003
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States (including the Federal District) 
 
 
 
Transfer design  
The central government may try and equalize fiscal capacities, as has been the case in many 
OECD countries, such that each local government has the capability of providing similar 
levels of services at similar levels of fiscal effort. This is the basis for equalization transfers 
in countries like Australia (see Ahmad and Searle 2006).  
 
The principles of the Australian system—focusing on spending needs and revenue capacities 
has been adopted in China, and resources available for equalization resources are gradually 
being increased (Ahmad, Li and Richardson, 2002). Information flows and the political 
process are important in ensuring that local officials are held accountable for the use of 
untied funds. Thus, in less developed countries where information flows are problematic and 
incomplete, there may not be adequate moral suasion to ensure that the basic services are 
actually provided at the sub-national level with sole reliance on “equalization transfers.” 
 
Alternatively, the center may choose to provide such services directly or through special 
purpose transfers designed to finance local provision of public services, say education or 
health care. This is the typical case, but it does not guarantee that the poorest will be reached, 
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as the execution is typically by sub-national governments. The difficulty is that any 
earmarked transfer from the center imposes a constraint on the local government. Matching 
arrangements have been used extensively in some advanced countries, especially the United 
States, in order to get some “buy-in” from the local governments. However, in developing 
countries, need is likely to be higher in the poorer localities with weaker sources of own-
revenues. Hence, establishing matching criteria might actually exclude some of the poorest 
localities, and hence deserving recipients. 
 
The linkages between transfer design and accountability as well as incentives to raise own-
revenues and manage spending efficiently are complex but very important. Typically, a range 
of transfers are used for different purposes. If the center also includes “gap-filling” deficit 
financing among the set of transfers, this could vitiate any of the other “incentives” to ensure 
accountability of local officials (Ahmad and Searle, 2006). 
 
D.   How to make special purpose transfers work? 
Can adequately targeted expenditure programs be designed that are financed by the central 
government but implemented by the local governments to minimize the incentives of local 
governments to divert central transfers for their own objectives? This has been a perennial 
problem in China, for example in ensuring minimum standards in education (e.g., number of 
years of schooling). Can communities determine priorities and monitor implementation? At 
the one extreme, there is a danger that funds could be diverted, and at the other that unfunded 
mandates might be created—in both cases it is possible that services would not be provided 
effectively. Moreover, the priorities may not reflect the interests of the poorest, particularly 
the most vulnerable members of society without sources of family support—the benefits 
from the transfers might accrue largely to powerful interest groups or officials. 
 
The central government’s (or donors’) problem is to design appropriate targeted or special 
purpose transfer programs to meet the needs of the poorest but executed by recipient agencies 
(or subnational governments).3 The objectives of the center and the recipient governments are 
often likely to be different—the recipients may have less concern with providing for the 
poorest as the responsibility for these groups may effectively lie with the center. In any case, 
the recipient local governments receiving funds, in the absence of full information, could use 
these for other purposes without significant penalty in the traditional single period budgeting 
framework.   
 
                                                 
3
 A similar problem exists when an international agency or donor country provides financing for special 
purposes to be implemented in a recipient country. 
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Ahmad, Tandberg and Zhang (2002) model a three-tier hierarchical structure of government 
that may be relevant for large countries such as Mexico or China: the central government is 
at the top level of the hierarchy, several provincial (state) governments in the middle layer, 
and a few local or county-level governments within the administrative area of each of the 
provinces. The interest of leaders of provincial and local governments is to maximize 
perquisites and their overall budgets.  
 
The central government sets aside a certain amount of financing for specific programs to be 
carried out by the localities. Ahmad, Tandberg and Zhang (2002) assume that the central 
government cannot contract directly with the localities, due to high-transaction costs or 
political reasons.  
 
The interaction between the provincial and local governments is nested in the central 
selection process. Prior to the submission of its bid, the provincial government arranges a 
bidding process among its localities. Each county within the province offers a bid proposal. 
The provincial government selects one and formulates the provincial proposal based on the 
selected local proposals. If the province wins the program in the central selection, it will 
receive the amount equal to its budget bid. Then the provincial government decides the 
proportion of the budget to be allocated to the locality, to carry out the program. The local 
government then determines the effort level it will exert to implement the program. This 
subsumes “local capture” or other diversion of funds, and is not directly observable by the 
higher levels of government. 
  
Figure 1 presents a simplified decision diagram of the three levels of governments.  The 
analysis is similar to the classical “prisoner’s dilemma.” It is generally not possible to obtain 
an efficient solution in a one-period game of this type. Unless the game is repeated or 
constricted in some other way, officials in transfer receiving jurisdictions will take decisions 
that are individually rational but which lead to suboptimal solutions and may not meet the 
objectives of the donor governments. There must be multiperiod interactions among the 
different levels of government. If the game is of only one period, the local governments will 
bid as low as possible to obtain the transfer; and may not effectively implement the scheme. 
In a multi-period game, where the governments care for their reputation in the future, it may 
be possible to identify low-cost agents, and to limit the possibility for a diversion of funds or 
inefficient implementation.  
 
In order to mitigate problems of asymmetric information, there must be some element 
of competition between the different governments at the same level. There should be 
more than one province bidding for the program in the central selection, and more than one 
locality in the provincial selection. To avoid moral hazard, the transfer scheme must 
include elements of punishment and rewards from the higher administration to the 
lower levels of government, based on the evaluation results of the final outcome. This serves 
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as either carrot or stick through its impact on the agents’ probability of winning future 
programs. The scheme also provides a “learning mechanism,” where the outcomes in one 
period have an impact on the central government’s assessment of the abilities of lower levels 
of government to meet their objectives in subsequent periods. Indeed, “reputation” in one set 
of observable programs might be used as proxy for likely effectiveness in program 
implementation in general—although there may be more incentive for local governments to 
implement investment projects rather than provide support to the indigent. 
 
In order to be able to select the program bids through a competitive process, the central 
government must be able to define the specification of programs very precisely, and to 
monitor the degree of compliance against these specifications. The objectives of the 
program should be measurable, standardized across the localities, and involve as little 
subjective judgment as possible. After implementation, it should be possible to evaluate 
whether objectives are achieved with minimal ambiguity. Unless these conditions are met, 
agents may be able to influence the central governments’ selection of program sites by 
providing substandard services in areas that are insufficiently defined in the program 
specifications. 
 
Key elements of the scheme (consistent with what is observed in reality) are that the central 
government is able to set the policy agenda and also that it is able, in principle, to cut off 
funds for non-compliance with agreed conditions. However, threats to cut off funds for the 
poorest groups may not be credible, especially given the overlapping responsibilities found in 
China or Mexico, but cross-conditionality involving threats to cut off investment funding 
strongly desired by local officials may be effectively utilized.      
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Figure 1. Decision Diagram for the Three Tiers of Governments 
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The design of policy to provide support to the poorest groups would involve cross-
conditionality, where outcomes for provision for the poor could be built into the 
agreement or contract for investment funds for the localities. Thus, by virtue of setting 
the agenda, the center can ensure that resources are adequately used for the poorest by 
threatening to withhold funds for projects or investments that are evidently within the 
preference function of the localities. 
 
A central result is for future transfers to be made conditional on policy reforms or on 
past performance. In practice, however, funds distributed by the central government are 
often independent of the past success of the program—given the typical single year 
budgeting framework with little feedback based on outcomes. In many cases, there is an 
incentive for a donor government to continue to give transfers for the program, not just 
because of incomplete information, but because funds that are not distributed might lapse. 
This places the emphasis on clearly identifying “outcomes” of policy actions that could be 
monitored, and in ensuring that future budgets are linked to the achievement of the 
outcomes—in a repeated game perspective. In more advanced cases, this has led to the 
development of “contract federalism,” (see Spahn, 2006). The findings of the model echo 
those from the foreign aid literature. Svensson (1999, 2003) suggests that the donor 
government’s ineffectiveness in providing incentives to improve the performance of targeted 
expenditure programs may be the consequence of a time-consistency problem. 
 
A policy option is to increase the effectiveness of targeted expenditure programs by 
introducing competition among local governments in different districts and across time. 
This formulation echoes the recent developments in the fiscal federalism literature that based 
efficient outcomes on enhanced competition (Breton, 2002, Ahmad and Martinez, 2004)). 
This allows the central government to distribute all the available transfers and is shown to 
solve the time-consistency problem described before. The funds that local governments will 
receive depend implicitly on the central government’s confidence in their ability to use these 
effectively. Therefore, even without explicit contracts, a local government may be induced to 
consider the central government’s interests when deciding on its own actions. This increases 
the local government’s likelihood for receiving more transfers in the future. In a one-period 
game approximating an annual budget process, recipient governments have incentives to 
cheat. Horizontal competition helps but is not sufficient to eliminate incentives to cheat.  
 
A combination of both horizontal and intertemporal competition eliminates incentives 
to divert resources from the objectives of the central government. The competition 
elements have implications for the information flows and budget models that might be 
relevant to ensure that funds for programs to reach the poorest are not diverted to other uses. 
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Budget processes and transparency: ensuring accountability 
The flow of standardized information is critical in providing a basis for evaluating how 
monies are used within and across jurisdictions. This involves the establishment of a 
common structure for the budget classification, e.g., based on the IMF’s standard for the 
economic classification: the Government Financial Statistics Manual 2001 (GFSM2001) and 
the UN’s classification of the functions of government. These need to be harmonized across 
all jurisdictions. In addition, most advanced countries use systems of Treasury Single 
Accounts to manage and track the government’s cash. In multi-level countries, it is also 
critical to set up standards for disclosure and reporting by sub-national governments. These 
requirements are described in Ahmad, Albino-War and Singh, 2006).   
 
Efforts to establish all of these requirements for information flows are underway in China, 
but are only beginning in Mexico. In both countries, the immediate issue remains to 
formulate policies and implementation plans in the context of incomplete information on the 
use of funds. To some extent, the use of multi-year budgets and competition for the use of 
funds across local governments and over time should be feasible in the relatively short term, 
even if the main public financial management reforms are likely to take time to implement 
fully. 
 
Attempts by central governments to introduce performance budgeting at all levels of 
government, without adequate systems to track and account for financial flows, are unlikely 
to be very successful. Indeed, experience has shown that this may even delay the basic 
information building blocks that are needed in the longer term. Without standardized 
information that can be used by households to compare performance across jurisdictions, and 
to use this to discipline local officials, it is not clear that reliance on citizens’ action 
groups and communities to self-police spending will be sufficient to prevent misuse or 
divergence of funds, except perhaps in egregious cases.  
 
The longer term goal must remain to establish standards for information flows and 
reporting that lead to transparency across and within governments. These are critical in 
achieving accountable operations at all levels of government. However, an immediate 
measure that can be implemented in most cases is to begin to use feedback mechanisms in 
the budget process system that take into account the effects and outcomes in meeting the 
needs of the poor.  
E.   Policy Implications 
Direct central provision of programs to support the poorest may be feasible in some 
countries, but may pose significant administrative difficulties in most countries. Local design 
and implementation uses the advantage of local information—but the variance in resource 
levels across localities in large countries may make it essential for there to be some central 
transfers for the poorest. The difficulty is that with central earmarked transfers, recipient 
governments have incentives to divert resources. 
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The typical one-period budget process encourages inefficient use of central transfers, even if 
diversion is not intended. The central government would generally like to make transfers 
conditional on policy reforms or past performance. One of the key policy implications is 
that a multi-year budget framework, including multi-year appropriations, would 
greatly facilitate the achievement of central government objectives, since this opens up 
the possibility of intertemporal competition across lower level jurisdictions. Within-year 
and intertemporal competition across lower level governments is important in 
mitigating the problems of asymmetric information. This also helps in controlling costs 
and ensuring efficiency in spending.  
Cross-conditionality in the design of transfers is important to address political economy 
issues. Threatening to withhold funds for the poorest groups of society might not be credible. 
However, it is feasible to withhold investment funds if the poverty-reduction objectives are 
not met. This cross-conditionality affects elements that are generally important in the 
preference functions of local officials and politicians. 
The central government must define precisely the specifications of programs and the 
conditions to be met, and to monitor the degree of compliance against these 
specifications.  While it might take time to establish proper government financial 
information management systems at all levels of government—this applies to Mexico as well 
as to China, both outputs and outcomes should be defined carefully to prevent misuse or 
misallocations of resources. 
It would also be helpful to be able to draw up actionable contracts between the center 
and the local governments. Given that the allocation of inputs is not easily observable, as 
far as possible the contracts should be able to specify identifiable outputs (even if the 
outcomes may not be simple to specify or monitor in many developing countries).  
In more advanced countries, there may be a possibility of moving towards performance 
budgeting at all levels of government, although the preconditions for this are quire 
demanding. But, in the short-run, there is considerable promise in clarifying responsibilities, 
defining outcomes and using targeted transfers within a multi-year budgetary context. 
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